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Gender and Attorney Negotiation Ethics  
Art Hinshaw   
Jess K. Alberts  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Belief and interest in gender differences are widespread and 
pervasive. From birth, male and female children are socialized into 
gender identities and roles that influence how they behave, perceive 
the world, and are perceived by the world. In addition to dressing 
their male and female children differently, parents typically play with 
their infants and toddlers, as well as approve and disapprove of their 
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behavior, based on each child’s biological sex.1 Two studies suggest 
that within twenty-four hours after birth, a child’s gender results in 
parents having different expectations for them, although this behavior 
occurs to a lesser degree these days than forty years ago.
2
 
While many studies highlight gender differences, some studies 
suggest the differences may be exaggerated. For example, many 
people believe that men and women communicate differently, and 
that belief is buoyed by researchers who argue that women’s verbal 
style is best described as supportive, egalitarian, personal, and 
disclosive, while characterizing men’s as instrumental, competitive, 
and assertive.
3
 However, other researchers refute this claim. A recent 
review of studies comparing males and females on a large array of 
psychological and communication differences revealed very few 
significant differences.
4
 In fact, some studies suggest the differences 
in men’s and women’s communication patterns are estimated to be as 
small as 1 percent, or even less.
5
  
When it comes to gender differences in ethical behavior, scholars 
and lay people believe that ethical decision-making is affected by 
gender.
6
 A number of studies have found differences in men’s and 
women’s ethical behavior,7 with past analyses suggesting that women 
are more likely to view certain questionable acts as unethical and are 
 
 1. See generally Susan D. Witt, Parental Influence on Children’s Socialization to 
Gender Roles, 32 ADOLESCENCE 256 (1997). 
 2. Jeffrey Z. Rubin et al., The Eye of the Beholder: Parents’ Views on Sex of Newborns, 
44 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 512, 514–17 (1974); Katherine Hildebrandt Karraker et al., 
Parents’ Gender-Stereotyped Perceptions of Newborns: The Eye of the Beholder Revisited, 33 
SEX ROLES 687, 697–700 (1995). 
 3. Anthony Mulac et al., Empirical Support for the Gender-as-Culture Hypothesis: An 
Intercultural Analysis of Male/Female Language Differences, 27 HUM. COMM. RES., 121, 141–
43 (2001). 
 4. Janet Shibley Hyde, The Gender Similarities Hypothesis, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 581, 
582, 586 (2005). 
 5. Daniel J. Canary & Kimberly Hause, Is there Any Reason to Research Sex Differences 
in Communication?, 41 COMMUN. Q. 129, 140 (1993). 
 6. Sean Valentine et al., Gender in Ethics: Ethical Judgments, Ethical Intentions, and 
Altruism Among Healthcare Professionals, 24 GENDER IN MGMT. 112, 114–16 (2009). 
 7. See, e.g., Terry W. Loe et al., A Review of Empirical Studies Assessing Ethical 
Decision Making in Business, 25 J. BUS. ETHICS 185, 186–87 (2000); Michael J. O’Fallon & 
Kenneth D. Butterfield, A Review of the Empirical Ethical Decision-Making Literature: 1996–
2003, 59 J. BUS. ETHICS 375, 376–79 (2005). 
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less willing to behave unethically.
8
 Studies of accounting students,
9
 
health practitioners,
10
 and business students
11
 all have determined that 
women report being less tolerant of unethical conduct than men. 
However, for every study concluding that women are more ethical 
than men, there are nearly as many that suggest there are few to no 
ethical differences between males and females.
12
  
Few studies of gender differences and legal ethics exist, and of 
these only a handful focus on gender and negotiation ethics.
13
 In light 
of the paucity of evidence on this topic, we decided to include gender 
as a component of a broader study of attorney negotiation ethics. This 
Article sets forth and discusses our findings and hypotheses regarding 
gender and negotiation ethics. 
Before discussing the results of the gender study reported in this 
Article, it is important to review some of the basic results of the 
broader study which have already been published elsewhere.
14
 We 
surveyed more than 700 practicing lawyers and asked whether they 
would agree with a client request to engage in a fraudulent 
 
 8. Danielle S. Beu et al., Ethical Decision-Making: A Multidimensional Construct, 12 
BUS. ETHICS 88, 93–94, 101 (2003); Leslie M. Dawson, Ethical Differences Between Men and 
Women in the Sales Profession, 16 J. BUS. ETHICS 1143, 1147, 1150 (1997); Peter Skogman 
Thoursie, Happy Birthday! You’re Insured! Gender Differences in Work Ethics, 94 ECON. 
LETTERS 141, 144 (2007); E. Sharon Mason & Peter E. Mudrack, Gender and Ethical 
Orientation: A Test of Gender and Occupational Socialization Theories, 15 J. BUS. ETHICS 599, 
601–02 (1996). 
 9. Elsie C. Ameen et al., Gender Differences in Determining the Ethical Sensitivity of 
Future Accounting Professionals, 15 J. BUS. ETHICS 591, 596 (1996). 
 10. Valentine et al., supra note 6, at 120, 122. 
 11. Michael Betz et al., Gender Differences in Proclivity for Unethical Behavior, 8 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 321, 324 (1989); Durwood Ruegger & Ernest W. King, A Study of the Effect of 
Age and Gender upon Student Business Ethics, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 179, 181–82, 184–85 (1992). 
 12. Donald Robin & Laurie Babin, Making Sense of the Research on Gender and Ethics 
in Business: A Critical Analysis and Extension, 7 BUS. ETHICS Q. 61, 71 (1997) (reviewing 
results of ten studies which consist of ninety-three total scenarios); James R. Davis & Ralph E. 
Welton, Professional Ethics: Business Students’ Perceptions, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 451, 462–63 
(1991); Charles W. McNichols & Thomas W. Zimmerer, Situational Ethics: An Empirical 
Study of Differentiators of Student Attitudes, 4 J. BUS. ETHICS 175, 180 (1985); Maria L. Roxas 
& Jane Y. Stoneback, The Importance of Gender Across Cultures in Ethical Decision-Making, 
50 J. BUS. ETHICS 149, 161–62 (2004); Andrew Sikula, Sr. & Adelmiro D. Costa, Are Women 
More Ethical than Men?, 13 J. BUS. ETHICS 859, 869 (1994). 
 13. Cf. infra Part IV. 
 14. See Art Hinshaw & Jess K. Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of 
Attorney Negotiation Ethics, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 95 (2011). 
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negotiation scheme to settle a case,
15
 a clear violation of Rule 4.1 of 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct governing the truthfulness 
of statements to others.
16
 Based on the respondents’ answers, we 
came to several important conclusions: 
 An unacceptably high number of lawyers indicate they 
would be willing to engage in a fraudulent settlement 
negotiation scheme in violation of Rule 4.1 if asked to do so 
by their client.  
 Considerable confusion surrounds the elements of Rule 4.1.  
 Lawyers may believe other legal principles take precedence 
over Rule 4.1.  
 Lawyers believe violations of Rule 4.1 are widespread.17  
These findings indicate a systemic problem in the legal profession, 
and we have made several recommendations to address the situation, 
including revising Rule 4.1 to clarify its requirements, improving 
instruction surrounding the rule, and increasing the rule’s 
enforcement.
18
 
As discussed earlier, the literature examining gender and ethics 
finds either that women act more ethically than men or that there is 
no difference between the sexes. Our findings in this study are more 
nuanced: while there was no difference in responses of men and 
women when asked to engage in a fraudulent negotiation strategy, 
there was a difference in response to a follow-up request to employ a 
pure omission strategy in the negotiation, a more subtle form of the 
fraudulent negotiation strategy.
19
 Unexpectedly, the men performed 
better than women.
20
 Additionally, the men performed better than 
women when asked whether the client’s initial request constituted a 
misrepresentation and whether a key fact was protected from 
 
 15. Id. at 99. 
 16. See infra Part II for an in-depth discussion of Rule 4.1 and its requirements. 
 17. Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 14, at 148–49. 
 18. Id. at 150–62. 
 19. See infra Part V.A.1–2. 
 20. See infra Part V.A.2. 
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disclosure by the Rules of Professional Conduct.
21
 Some of this 
difference correlated with the amount of respondent professional 
experience,
22
 but that does not explain the entire difference in the 
results. However, the survey instrument was not designed to 
investigate and uncover those additional reasons. Thus, we cannot 
definitively explain the gender differences; rather, we must 
hypothesize what these other factors may be, such as differences in 
the manner in which women and men organize information when 
making decisions, differences in how men and women respond in 
ambiguous ethical situations, and differences in how men and women 
advocate for others.  
We caution against using the data presented here to conclude that 
male attorneys are more ethical negotiators than female attorneys. 
Why? Primarily because there was no difference between men and 
women in response to the client’s first request to engage in a 
fraudulent negotiation strategy. Furthermore, some studies designed 
to uncover gender differences use numerous ethics scenarios to 
determine how men and women compare; in those studies women 
typically outperform men on the whole while men usually outperform 
women on certain scenarios.
23
 Our study presented participants with 
only one hypothetical situation and could well fall into the category 
of negotiation scenarios where men outperform women.  
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. In Part II we 
explain the requirements of the professional rules of attorney conduct 
governing negotiation, and in Part III we discuss the study’s 
methodology and findings from the larger study. Part IV offers a 
detailed review of the literature related to the influence of gender on 
ethical decision-making. The data resulting from this study is 
presented in Part V, and in Part VI, we discuss potential explanations 
for our findings in addition to addressing our study’s limitations. In 
conclusion, Part VII makes several suggestions for further studies on 
this topic. 
 
 21. See infra Part V.A.3–4. 
 22. See infra tbls.4, 5, 7, 8, 10 and 11. 
 23. See, e.g., William A. Weeks et al., The Effects of Gender and Career Stage on Ethical 
Judgment, 20 J. BUS. ETHICS 301, 307 (1999) (reporting that women adopted a more ethical 
stance than men in seven out of nineteen vignettes and men adopted more ethical stance than 
women in two out of nineteen vignettes).  
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II. NEGOTIATION AND THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT 
Promulgated by the American Bar Association in 1983 and 
adopted in virtually every jurisdiction since,
24
 the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct regulate attorney behavior in all aspects of their 
work, including negotiation. The Model Rules’ regulation of attorney 
negotiation behavior stems from Rule 4.1, which states:  
RULE 4.1 TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not 
knowingly: 
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third 
person; or 
 
 24. California is currently the only state without a code of professional conduct patterned 
after the Model Rules. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/ 
model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012); see ALA. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT (2006); ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2009); ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 42 
(2003); ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2005); COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2008); 
CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2007); DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2008); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. BAR ch. 4 (West 2004); GA. R. BAR pt. IV (2009); HAW. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT (1993); IDAHO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2004); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. S. CT. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, art. VIII (West 2009); IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2005); 
IOWA CODE ANN. ch. 32 (West 2005); KAN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2007); KY. SUP. CT. 
R. 3.130 (2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, ch. 4, art. XVI (2009); ME. BAR RULE 3 (2009); 
MD. RULE 16-812 (2005); MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1997); MICH. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT (1988); 52 MINN. STAT. ANN., RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2006); MISS. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT (2005); MO. SUP. CT. R. 4 (2010); MONT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
(2004); NEB. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2005); NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2006); 
N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2008); N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2004); N.M. STATE 
CT. R. 16 (2008); N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2008); N.C. STATE BAR R. ch. 2 (2003); 
N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2006); OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2007); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A (2001); OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2005); PA. RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2005); R.I. SUP. CT. R. art. V (2007); S.C. APP. CT. R. 407 (2005); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 16-18, app. (2009); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8 (2002); TEX. GOV’T CODE tit. 2, 
subtit. G, app. A, art. X, § 9 (2009); UTAH RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2005); VT. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT (2009); VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2007); WASH. LTD. PRACTICE 
OFFICER RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2007); W. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1988); WIS. 
SUP. CT. R. 20 (2007); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2006). 
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(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or 
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by 
Rule 1.6.
25
 
The key to understanding Rule 4.1’s application is to understand the 
term ―material.‖ A material fact is one in which a reasonable person 
would view the fact as important to a fair understanding of what is 
being exchanged in the deal.
26
 This is a fairly broad standard, and 
Comment 2 to the rule narrows the definition of material fact by 
exempting (a) ―[e]stimates of price or value . . . on the subject of the 
transaction‖ and (b) ―a party’s intentions as to an acceptable 
settlement of a claim.‖27 Thus, assuming a statement is covered by 
the broad language in the rule itself, one must determine whether the 
statement falls into the comment’s exception to the general rule.28 
―Material‖ law is law that is either ―significant‖ or ―essential‖ to the 
negotiation.
29
 To summarize, when speaking about material issues, 
Rule 4.1(a) ―requires lawyers to speak the truth as they understand it 
without engaging in any misrepresentations.‖30 
The general rule for omissions under Rule 4.1 is that ―lawyers 
have no duty voluntarily to inform an opposing party of relevant facts 
when negotiating.‖31 However, Rule 4.1(b) creates ―a duty to disclose 
material facts or law . . . if doing so avoids assisting in a client’s 
criminal conduct or fraud.‖32 Yet, the rule is written so that this duty 
 
 25. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (1983). 
 26. See Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449 (D. Md. 2002), aff’d, 
352 F.3d 896 (4th Cir. 2003). Because the standard for summary judgment also uses the phrase 
―material fact,‖ it is easy to confuse the two standards. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). 
 27. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. (1983). A third item that falls into the 
―non-material fact‖ category under the comment is ―the existence of an undisclosed principal 
except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud.‖ Id. 
 28. See Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 14, at 103. 
 29. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (9th ed. 2009). 
 30. Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 14, at 104. 
 31. Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 14, at 104 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 4.1 cmt. (1983)).  
 32. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (1983). The Model Rules 
define fraud as ―conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the 
applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive.‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.0(d) (2003). The basic common law definition of fraud is found in numerous sources 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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appears to be limited by Rule 1.6, the rule requiring attorneys to 
maintain client confidences.
33
 As we have discussed in depth 
elsewhere, the clause referring to Rule 1.6 is a superfluous exception 
to Rule 4.1(b) and should be removed from the Rule.
34
  
In practice, Rule 4.1 does little more than declare that attorneys 
must comply with the common law’s prohibition of fraudulent 
misrepresentations in negotiation.
35
 As a result, many commentators 
agree that a negotiator’s personal ethical standards likely provide 
more scrupulous guidance than Rule 4.1.
36
 Nevertheless, clients may 
request that their attorneys engage in negotiation conduct that 
violates their personal ethics and/or Rule 4.1. In response to such a 
request, the attorney should first discuss with the client the 
consequences of following the request.
37
 If the client refuses to 
reconsider the action, then the lawyer should withdraw from the 
representation.
38
  
 
including: State v. Galioto, 613 P.2d 852, 856 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (―Fraud is an instance or 
act of trickery or deceit; an act of deluding; an intentional misrepresentation for the purpose of 
inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing.‖); Smile v. Lawson, 435 
S.W.2d 325, 328 (Mo. 1968) (―Fraud is defined as an instance or act of trickery or deceit 
especially when involving misrepresentation; an act of deluding.‖ (citing Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary)); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §§ 525–51 (1977). 
 33.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 4.1(b). 
 34. See Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 14, at 105, 155–56. Rule 1.6’s exceptions permit 
lawyers to disclose fraudulent and criminal conduct; thus such information is not required to be 
kept confidential. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)–(2) (1983). 
Additionally, the general requirements of Rule 1.6 have always been subject to Rule 1.2(d)’s 
prohibition against knowingly participating in a client’s criminal or fraudulent conduct. MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (1983); In re Potts, 158 P.3d 418, 425 (Mont. 2007) 
(holding that Rule 1.6 does not shield a lawyer from requirements of Rule 1.2(d)); 2 Law of 
Lawyering (Aspen) § 37.6 (3d ed. 2001). 
 35. For an in-depth discussion of these issues, see Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 14, at 
102–06. 
 36. See Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
493, 503 and 529 (1989); see also MARTIN E. LATZ, GAIN THE EDGE! NEGOTIATING TO GET 
WHAT YOU WANT 250 (2004) (warning ―don’t use a tactic if you find it morally objectionable 
or just plain wrong‖); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO 
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 282 (2000) (advising negotiators to follow their own 
moral convictions). 
 37. See Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 14, at 105–06. 
 38. In re Potts, 158 P.3d at 425; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1), (b)(3) 
(1983); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992). 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND REVIEW OF PRIOR FINDINGS 
The respondents completed a web-based questionnaire that 
presented a negotiation scenario adapted from the fact pattern in the 
DONS Negotiation developed by the Program on Negotiation at 
Harvard Law School.
39
 Specifically, the scenario focuses on 
settlement negotiations for a threatened lawsuit where the study-
participant attorney represents a client who believed his former 
girlfriend infected him with the hypothetical DONS virus, a fatal 
virus for which there is no cure.
40
 The way the scenario is presented, 
the question of whether the client was infected by his former 
girlfriend is not disputed; the negotiation presents itself simply to 
answer the question of how much money will change hands in order 
to keep a potential lawsuit from being filed.
41
 
After the setup, the questionnaire placed the respondent in the 
moments just before the face-to-face negotiations were about to begin 
when the client revealed some startling news—he recently found out 
that he does not have the disease after all; his test results were a false 
positive.
42
 Despite the good news, the client remains angry because 
he had been grappling with his death sentence on many different 
levels, including quitting his job and selling or giving away his 
belongings.
43
 As a result, he wants to punish his former girlfriend for 
her reckless behavior.
44
 To do so, he asks his attorney, the 
respondent, to refrain from revealing the fact that he is DONS-free 
during the settlement negotiation.
45
 The survey began here by asking 
participants if they would or would not agree to the client’s request.46  
 
 39. The hypothetical scenario used for this study was adapted with permission from the 
DONS Negotiation, written by Robert C. Bordone and Jonathan Cohen based on another 
simulation by Nevan Elam and Whitney Fox. Copies of the DONS Negotiation simulation are 
available from the Program on Negotiation Clearinghouse at http://www.pon.org or 800-258-
4406.  
 40. Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 14, at 116. 
 41. See id. at 116–17. 
 42. Id. at 116. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 116–17. 
 46. For a brief overview of the survey questions, see id. at 117. 
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The survey then proceeded to pose follow-up questions asking 
why the respondent agreed or disagreed with the client’s request.47 
Next, a subset of respondents, those who either were not sure how 
they would respond to the client’s request and those who would not 
agree to the client’s request, were asked a softer version of the 
client’s initial request—would they refrain from disclosing the fact 
that he is DONS-free unless the other side specifically asks about his 
DONS status? The questionnaire concluded by focusing on the 
entirety of the respondents and their understanding of the elements of 
Rule 4.1, the rule governing truthfulness with others.
48
  
At its essence, the hypothetical tests whether respondents can 
navigate Rule 4.1’s admonition against engaging in fraudulent or 
criminal conduct in conjunction with Rule 1.2’s prohibition of 
engaging in criminal or fraudulent conduct, which overrides Rule 
1.6’s general rule for keeping client confidences.49 The way to 
respond to the client’s requests and properly navigate these rules is to 
refuse both requests.
50
 
Looking at this problem from the client’s perspective, tort law 
creates a duty for the client to correct his former girlfriend’s 
erroneous belief that he is infected with the DONS virus. His 
statement to her created her belief and the information that he 
subsequently acquired made his statement to her that he had the 
disease untrue.
51
 Going forward with the negotiation without 
disclosing that his belief was mistaken and that he does not actually 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Arizona and Missouri have adopted Rules 4.1 and 1.2(d), two of the three rules 
implicated in the hypothetical, and their comments without material modification. ARIZ. SUP. 
CT. R. 42, ER 1.2(d), 4.1; MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.2(f), -4.1. Arizona and Missouri have adopted a 
slightly different version of Rule 1.6 as compared to the Model Rule. However, these deviations 
have no impact on the analysis of the interplay of Rules 4.1 and 1.6 in a negotiation context. 
Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)-(6) (2003), with ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 
42, ER 1.6(d)(1)-(6), and MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.6(b)(1)-(4). 
 50. For a more in-depth discussion of the following analysis, see Hinshaw & Alberts, 
supra note 14, at 118–20. 
 51. Id. at 118; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(c) (1977). 
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have the virus constitutes a fraudulent misrepresentation.
52
 By 
extension, the client’s request that his lawyer refrain from disclosing 
his actual DONS status to induce a settlement would constitute a 
request to engage in a fraudulent settlement scheme on his behalf.
53
  
Any attempt by the attorney to knowingly assist the client in this 
negotiation scheme violates the Model Rules.
54
 If in the negotiation 
the lawyer were to make an actual misrepresentation of the client’s 
DONS status or were to request money as reimbursement for any 
future DONS-related symptoms, the lawyer would violate Rule 
4.1(a).
55
 The lawyer would violate Rule 4.1(b)’s omission standard if 
she simply failed to try to correct the former girlfriend’s mistaken 
belief.
56
  
The aggregated results of the survey, which report the findings 
from 734 respondents from the Phoenix, Arizona and St. Louis, 
Missouri metropolitan areas, found that in response to the client’s 
initial request to refrain from disclosing his DONS-free condition, 62 
percent of the respondents said that they would not agree to such a 
request, while 19 percent said they would agree to the client’s 
request.
57
 The remaining 19 percent of the respondents indicated they 
were not sure how they would respond if placed in this situation.
58
 
 
 52. See id. §§ 526, 551(1) & cmt. h. Comment h specifically addresses this situation as 
follows: 
One who, having made a representation which when made was true or believed to be 
so, remains silent after he has learned that it is untrue and that the person to whom it is 
made is relying upon it in a transaction with him, is morally and legally in the same 
position as if he knew the statement was false when made.   
Id. § 551, cmt. h. 
 53. See id. §§ 525, 526; see also In re Kersting, 726 P.2d 587, 592 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc) 
(holding that attorney’s failure to disclose material facts about client’s substitution of less 
marketable land as investment collateral violated Rules); In re Cupples, 979 S.W.2d 932, 936–
37 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 54. To meet the scienter requirement the lawyer only needs to know or believe the matter 
is not as he or she represents it to be, not that the conduct is fraudulent. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 526(a) (1977). Even in instances where a lawyer finds that her work has 
unwittingly been used to further an ongoing fraud, the lawyer has a duty to correct the 
misapprehension. See 2 Law of Lawyering, supra note 34, § 37.5; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 551(1) (1977). 
 55. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-375 (1993). 
 56. Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 14, at 119; see also supra Part II. 
 57. Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 14, at 118. 
 58. Id. 
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The responses to the client’s second request—to disclose his DONS-
free status only if directly asked whether he had DONS
59—revealed 
similar results. Sixty-four percent of these respondents (592 
respondents) indicated they would refuse the request, 13 percent 
indicated that they would agree, and 23 percent replied that they were 
not sure what they would do.
60
  
Focusing on the client’s first request, we asked those who 
indicated they would agree with this request to rate the importance of 
a number of potential justifications for their decision to agree with 
the client’s request. Using a 10 point scale, with 1 being ―not at all 
important‖ and 10 being ―very important,‖ this subset of respondents 
gave only three proposed rationales importance ratings higher than 
the midpoint: ―The information is protected by the professional rules 
of conduct regarding client confidences‖ (mean = 9.63), ―[t]he 
information is protected by attorney-client privilege‖ (mean = 9.60), 
and ―[t]he client has specifically requested that this information not 
be disclosed‖ (mean = 8.19).61 For those who indicated they would 
not agree to the client’s request, we asked them to rate the importance 
of a number of potential justifications to refuse the client’s request. 
Using a 10 point scale, with 1 being ―not at all important‖ to 10 being 
―very important,‖ all but one proffered rationale was rated above the 
midpoint with the following three being rated as very important: ―My 
integrity is too important‖ (mean = 9.65), ―[t]o do so may violate the 
rules of professional conduct‖ (mean = 9.54), and ―[m]y moral 
compass will not allow me to do so‖ (mean = 9.18).62 
 
 59. This request was only addressed to those respondents who either refused the first 
request or weren’t sure what they would do in response to that request. 
 60. Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 14, at 120. 
 61. Id. at 125. The remaining proffered rationales rated as follows: ―Since the suit is not 
yet on file, there is no need to disclose anything at this time‖ (mean = 4.08), ―[a] lawyer has no 
affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts‖ (mean = 3.91), ―[d]isclosing the 
information compromises my role as a zealous advocate‖ (mean = 3.75), ―[t]he information is 
harmful to the client’s claim‖ (mean = 3.52), ―[n]ot disclosing the client’s DONS status unless 
directly asked is typical negotiation behavior‖ (mean = 3.43), and ―[f]ailing to disclose client’s 
DONS status at this time is typical negotiation behavior‖ (mean = 2.76). Id. 
 62. Id. at 128. The remaining proffered rationales were rated as follows: ―If there is a 
lawsuit, the fact that he does not have the virus will come to light‖ (mean = 7.02), the ―[c]lient 
does not understand the consequences to you if you follow his request‖ (mean = 6.46), the 
―[c]lient does not understand the consequences to him if you follow his request‖ (mean = 6.29), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol39/iss1/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012]  Gender and Attorney Negotiation Ethics 157 
 
 
 When combining the results of the client’s two requests, we 
found that 30 percent of the respondents agreed to engage in the 
fraudulent settlement negotiation scheme in violation of Rule 4.1,
63
 
50 percent of the respondents refused both client requests, thereby 
following the proper course of action, and the remaining 20 percent 
responded that they were unsure how to respond to one or both 
requests.
64
 The study also revealed that potential reasons for this 
problem include considerable confusion among some attorneys 
regarding the elements of Rule 4.1. That is, just more than a quarter 
of the respondents failed to recognize that refraining from disclosing 
the client’s DONS-free status constituted a misrepresentation,65 and 
many were unable to properly identify various material facts in the 
hypothetical negotiation.
66
 The study also revealed that many 
attorneys believe that confidentiality concerns, such as client 
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege, trump the Model 
Rule’s dictates to refrain from assisting clients in fraudulent 
conduct.
67
  
For the purposes of the current study we took the group of 
respondents and compared how women and men responded to the 
survey.
68
 When comparing the professional experience of the two 
respondent groups, we found the longest period of bar licensure 
 
and ―[n]egotiation strategy decisions should be made by lawyers, not their clients‖ (mean = 
3.68). Id. 
 63. Id. at 120. 
 64. Id. ―The category of unsure respondents breaks down as follows: 11 percent (80 
respondents) refused one of the client’s requests but were not sure what they would do in 
response to the client’s other request, suggesting they were leaning toward complying with Rule 
4.1, and the remaining 9 percent (67 respondents) were not sure what they would do in response 
to both client requests.‖ Id. at 120 n.127. 
 65. When asked if failing to disclose the client’s actual DONS-free status was a 
misrepresentation, 26 percent of the respondents indicated it was not and another 13 percent 
indicated that they were not sure. Id. at 123. 
 66. When asked if the client’s DONS-free status was a material fact in the negotiation, 16 
percent of the respondents indicated that it was not material to the negotiation. Id. at 122. 
Additionally, 67 percent of the respondents mistakenly indicated that the girlfriend’s desire to 
settle the claim was a material fact to the negotiation. Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 4.1 cmt. (1983) (stating that a party’s intentions to settle a claim are not considered material 
facts to a negotiation).  
 67. Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 14, at 126. 
 68. For more information about the study’s respondents, see Hinshaw & Alberts, supra 
note 14, at 115. 
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among the women respondents was thirty-four years while eighty 
male participants reported more than thirty-four years since licensure. 
Given this discrepancy and the likelihood that it could distort the 
study’s findings,69 we limited our analysis to those respondents who 
identified themselves as having been licensed for thirty-four years or 
fewer at the time of the survey. Furthermore, a number of 
respondents refused to indicate their gender or the date they were first 
licensed to practice law, and those responses were not included in this 
analysis. Thus, this study analyzes the results of a total of 617 
respondents; of that number, 417 identified themselves as men and 
200 identified themselves as women. 
IV. GENDER AND ETHICS RESEARCH 
The literature on the intersection of gender and ethics is large and 
diverse, with scholars from many disciplines attempting to determine 
the impact of gender on ethical perceptions and decision-making. 
This plethora of studies is due, in part, to a societal fascination with 
gender differences and also, in part, to the relative ease with which 
one can factor this variable into a study.
70
  
Generally, the results from these studies are mixed, typically 
finding that women behave more ethically than men or that no 
differences exist between the sexes. For example, a meta-analysis of 
research on gender differences in perceptions of ethical business 
decision-making examined data from more than 20,000 respondents 
and showed that women were more likely than men to perceive 
specific hypothetical business practices as unethical,
71
 while a meta 
review of 14 studies of gender and ethical judgments reported 
―inconclusive findings regarding gender differences and ethical 
 
 69. When analyzing gender differences in professional contexts, it is important to factor 
professional experience into the analysis because purported gender differences may be the 
result of variances in experience rather than gender. See generally Ruegger & King, supra note 
11, at 184–85. 
 70. See Amy Cohen, Gender: An (Un)Useful Category of Prescriptive Negotiation 
Analysis?, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 169, 181 (2003).  
 71. George R. Franke et al., Gender Differences in Ethical Perceptions of Business 
Practices: A Social Role Theory Perspective, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 920, 928 (1997) 
(surveying sixty-six separate data samples). 
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judgment,‖72 though it noted that whenever a difference was found, 
women were more ethical.
73
  
Some scholars have attempted to provide a more nuanced 
understanding of gender differences in ethical conduct by examining 
other demographic characteristics that might influence individuals’ 
ethical stances. For example, a number of studies have examined the 
impact of age or work experience on men’s and women’s ethical 
choices.
74
 Uniformly, these studies have found that gender 
differences are mitigated by respondents’ ages and work experience, 
with older and more experienced respondents responding more 
ethically and demonstrating few gender differences, though where 
gender differences did exist, women were often found to be more 
ethical. For instance, although one study of business professionals 
determined that career stage had a major impact on ethical 
judgments, women were nonetheless found to be more ethical in 
seven of nineteen scenarios, while men were more ethical in two of 
nineteen scenarios.
75
  
The preponderance of studies finding women to be more ethical, 
in fact, led the authors of one study to go so far as to proclaim: ―Our 
results suggest that further research assessing only this question is 
unwarranted; on average, women do show higher ethical standards 
than men.‖76 However they moderated their tone, cautioning that ―[i]t 
is important to recognize that the gender similarities in ethical 
perceptions are greater than the gender differences.‖77  
When it comes to attorney professional discipline, there is no 
question that women fare better than men. A study of attorney 
discipline actions across the United States found that female 
attorneys were subject to discipline at a significantly lower rate than 
their male counterparts relative to their respective proportions in the 
attorney population.
78
 A comparable study of attorney discipline in 
 
 72. Weeks et al., supra note 23, at 303. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See, e.g., Franke et al., supra note 71, at 925; Ruegger & King, supra note 11, at 182–
84; Weeks et al., supra note 23, at 311. 
 75. Weeks et al., supra note 23. 
 76. Franke et al., supra note 71. 
 77. Id. at 929. 
 78. Patricia W. Hatamyar & Kevin M. Simmons, Are Women More Ethical Lawyers? An 
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Australia yielded similar results.
79
 These results lead many to believe 
that female attorneys are more ethical than male attorneys.  
While our research turned up no other studies of gender and 
attorney negotiation ethics, the few studies of gender and legal 
negotiations have revealed few differences between women and men. 
For example, a study of more than 727 attorneys in Milwaukee and 
Chicago found ―no statistically significant difference in overall 
[perceived] effectiveness‖ based on the gender of attorney 
negotiators.
80
 Similarly, one professor tracked years of negotiated 
outcomes from his law school negotiation course and found no 
discernible differences in outcomes between women and men.
81
  
Consequently, based on the large body of research analyzing 
gender differences in ethical perceptions and behavior, as well as the 
more limited research specifically examining gender differences in 
legal negotiations, we hypothesized that, when it comes to 
conforming to the rules regulating attorney negotiation ethics, either 
there would be no differences between women and men or women 
would conform to the rules more than men would. 
V. RESULTS 
The data reported in this Section is organized around four separate 
questions. The first two questions are the threshold questions 
presented to the respondents—that is, the two client requests to 
refrain from disclosing his actual DONS status. The next two 
questions focus on the assessments respondents made regarding 
competing legal doctrines, misrepresentation, and client 
confidentiality. The data for each question is organized around three 
 
Empirical Study, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 785, 800 (2004) (finding that ―less than half the 
number of female attorneys that would be expected to be disciplined [based on their proportion 
of the attorney population] were actually disciplined‖ in year 2000). 
 79. Francesca Bartlett & Lyn Aitken, Competence in Caring in Legal Practice, 16 INT’L J. 
LEGAL PROF. 241, 241–42 (2009). 
 80. CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., NEGOTIATION: PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM 
SOLVING 411–12 (2006) (reporting gender results from data collected as part of the study 
reported in Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the 
Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 143 (2002)). 
 81. Charles B. Craver & David W. Barnes, Gender, Risk Taking, and Negotiation 
Performance, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 347 (1999). 
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variables: gender, time since licensure, and gender by time since 
licensure. Time since licensure is included in this study to ensure that 
the gender results were not simply capturing experiential 
differences.
82
 
Of the 617 survey respondents analyzed in this study, 417 
identified themselves as men and 200 identified themselves as 
women. As explained earlier, we limited the set of respondents to 
those who reported having been licensed for thirty-four years or 
fewer at the time of taking the survey, as no women reported being 
licensed for more than that length of time.
83
  
To test whether experience influenced the results, we divided the 
respondents into three groups that best approximated professional 
milestones—fewer than ten years since licensure, ten to nineteen 
years since licensure, and twenty or more years (up to 34) since 
licensure. 
TABLE 1 
TIME SINCE LICENSURE (IN YEARS) 
TIME SINCE LICENSURE (IN YEARS) 
Fewer than 10 23% 
10 to 19 30% 
20 or more 47% 
As Table 1 indicates, nearly half of the respondents had been 
licensed to practice law for twenty or more years, and nearly one-
third had been licensed from ten to nineteen years. Fewer than a 
quarter of the respondents had been licensed for ten years or fewer.  
 
 82. See Franke et al., supra note 71, at 925; Ruegger & King, supra note 11, at 182–84; 
Weeks et al., supra note 23, at 311. When reporting our prior nongendered findings we looked 
at time since licensure and found that the primary differences occurred after nearly two decades 
of practice. See Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 14, at 138, 146. 
 83. See supra Part III. 
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A comparison of the respondents’ genders at the three experience 
levels appears below in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
GENDER BY TIME SINCE LICENSURE 
TIME SINCE LICENSURE (IN YEARS) 
GENDER 
FEMALE MALE 
Fewer than 10  33% 18% 
10 to 19 33% 29% 
20 or more 34% 53% 
Note: x2(2, n = 617) = 22.6; p < .01   
Nearly one-third of the female respondents fit into each level of 
experience. A slight majority of the male respondents had been 
licensed for twenty or more years, while only 18 percent of the male 
respondents fell into the fewer than ten years category. The 
differences shown in Table 2 were statistically significant,
84
 
confirming the importance of adding this comparison to the analysis. 
A. Client’s First Request 
As explained earlier, we first asked all of the respondents whether 
they would agree to refrain from disclosing the client’s actual DONS-
free status during the negotiation with his former girlfriend. The 
correct answer is ―no.‖ 
1. Gender  
No statistically significant gender differences were found in the 
responses to the client’s first request,85 despite some minor variations 
in responses between the men and women. Furthermore, upon testing 
the justifications for agreeing or refusing the client’s request, there 
were minimal differences between women and men.
86
 
 
 84. x2(2, n = 617) = 22.6; p < .01 
 85. x2(2, n = 617) = 4.5; p = .11 
 86. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text for a list of the various justifications. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol39/iss1/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012]  Gender and Attorney Negotiation Ethics 163 
 
 
2. Time Since Licensure 
The analysis of professional experience on participants’ responses 
to the client’s request revealed minor variations in responses, but no 
statistically significant differences between women and men.
87
  
3. Gender by Time Since Licensure 
Next we analyzed whether the combination of gender and time 
since licensure affected participants’ responses to the client’s first 
request. Our analysis revealed some small variations among the 
categories, resulting in those at the mid-level of experience (10–19 
years) in both genders slightly outperforming the other groups. But 
despite the variation, the results of the analysis were not statistically 
significant.
88
  
B. Client’s Second Request 
Those respondents (500 total; 153 women and 347 men) who 
indicated that they would either refuse the client’s initial request or 
were unsure how they would answer the initial request were asked a 
follow-up request: would you agree to refrain from disclosing the 
client’s DONS-free status unless directly asked about it. The correct 
answer is ―no.‖  
 
There were no differences between men and women with respect to the nine justifications for 
agreeing with the client’s first request. There were differences between men and women with 
respect to three of the seven justifications for refusing the client’s initial request, all of them 
with women rating the justification as more important than men. Those justifications are: the 
client doesn’t understand the consequences to him F(1, n = 378) = 5.97, p < .05; my moral 
compass will not allow me to agree F(1, n = 378) = 4.99, p < .05; and lawyers should make 
negotiation strategy decisions not clients F(1, n = 378) = 5.02, p < .05. See Hinshaw & Alberts, 
supra note 14, at 124–29 (describing various justifications for agreeing and disagreeing with 
client’s initial request). 
 87. x2(4, n = 619) = 2.6, p = .63 
 88. x2(10, n = 617) = 13.4; p = .20 
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1. Gender 
The results of comparing the data by gender appear in Table 3 
below. 
TABLE 3 
CLIENT’S SECOND REQUEST BY GENDER 
QUESTION RESPONSE 
GENDER 
FEMALE MALE 
If the client instead said you could disclose 
his DONS-negative status if you were 
directly asked about it, but asked you 
otherwise to refrain from disclosing his 
DONS status, would you agree to that 
request? 
Yes 18% 12% 
No 53% 68% 
Not Sure 29% 20% 
Note: x2(2, n = 500) = 10.8; p < .01 
Men were more likely to answer this question ―no‖ (68 percent) 
than women (53 percent), thus refusing to agree to withhold the 
information. Women, however, were more likely than men to answer 
―not sure‖ (29 to 20 percent) and ―yes‖ (18 to 12 percent). The results 
illustrated in Table 2 are statistically significant.
89
 As with 
justifications for agreeing with the client’s first request, there were no 
statistically significant differences between men and women when 
comparing justifications for agreeing to the client’s second request.90  
 
 89. x2(2, n = 500) = 10.8; p < .01 
 90. The six justifications offered were: disclosing the client’s DONS status without being 
asked about it compromises my role as a zealous advocate, this is the manner in which the 
client wishes to proceed in the negotiation, the information is harmful to the client’s claim, not 
disclosing the client’s DONS negative status unless directly asked about it is typical negotiation 
behavior, since the suit is not on file, there is no need to disclose anything at this time, a lawyer 
has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing counsel of relevant facts. See Hinshaw & 
Alberts, supra note 14, at 129–31. 
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2. Time Since Licensure 
The responses to client’s second request organized by time since 
licensure appear in Table 4 below. 
TABLE 4 
CLIENT’S SECOND REQUEST BY TIME SINCE LICENSURE 
QUESTION 
TIME SINCE LICENSURE (IN YEARS) 
RESPONSE 
FEWER 
THAN 10 
10 TO 
19 
20 OR 
MORE 
If the client instead said you could 
disclose his DONS-negative status 
if you were directly asked about 
it, but asked you otherwise to 
refrain from disclosing his DONS 
status, would you agree to that 
request? 
Yes 21% 12% 11% 
No 54% 63% 68% 
Not Sure 25% 24% 21% 
Note: x2(4, n = 502) = 9.4, p = .05 
The analysis of the effect of time since licensure on the client’s 
second request found that the least experienced attorneys reported 
being almost twice as likely to respond ―yes‖ than did those with 
more than ten years and more than twenty years of experience. The 
widest gap occurred in the ―no‖ response between those with lower 
levels of experience and those with higher levels of experience at a 
rate of 54 to 68 percent. Little variation occurred among the three 
experience levels in the ―not sure‖ category (ranging from 21 to 25 
percent). Despite the apparent disparity in results, the results depicted 
in Table 5 are, at best, only marginally significant.
91
  
 
 91. x2(4, n = 502) = 9.4; p = .05 
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3. Gender by Time Since Licensure 
The responses to the client’s second request, organized by gender 
and time since licensure, appear in Table 5 below.  
TABLE 5 
CLIENT’S SECOND REQUEST BY GENDER AND TIME SINCE 
LICENSURE 
QUESTION 
RESPONSE 
TO 
CLIENT’S 
REQUEST 
GENDER AND TIME SINCE LICENSURE (IN YEARS) 
FEMALE MALE 
FEWER 
THAN 10 
10 TO 
19 
20 OR 
MORE 
FEWER 
THAN 10 
10 TO 
19 
20 OR 
MORE 
If the client instead said 
you could disclose his 
DONS negative status 
if you were directly 
asked about it, but 
asked you otherwise to 
refrain from disclosing 
his DONS status, 
would you agree to that 
request? 
Yes 29% 8% 15% 14% 14% 9% 
No 44% 64% 52% 62% 63% 74% 
Not sure 27% 28% 33% 24% 23% 17% 
Note: x2 (10, n = 500) = 25.7, p < .01 
As the Table reveals, women respondents with fewer than ten 
years since licensure indicated that they would agree to the client’s 
second request at a rate of 29 percent, whereas the next closest group, 
women with twenty or more years since licensure, agreed at a rate of 
only 15 percent. The group reporting the lowest rate of agreement 
with this request was women with ten to nineteen years since 
licensure at 8 percent. The group with the highest rate of refusing the 
client’s request, men with twenty or more years since licensure, did 
so at 74 percent, while the group with the lowest rate of refusing the 
client’s request was women with fewer than ten years since licensure, 
did so at 44 percent. Finally, the respondents with the lowest rate for 
―not sure‖ responses to this request, at 17 percent, were the men with 
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twenty or more years of experience, and the group with the highest 
percentage of respondents in this category, at 33 percent, was women 
with twenty or more years since licensure. Outside of the women 
with twenty or more years of experience, it appears that more 
experience results in more ―no‖ responses to the client’s request and 
fewer ―yes‖ responses. The data appearing in Table 5 is statistically 
significant.
92
 
C. Misrepresentation 
The comments to Rule 4.1 specifically warn attorneys to refrain 
from making misrepresentations through omissions.
93
 To determine if 
the respondents recognized that the omission contemplated in the 
client’s second request could be a misrepresentation, the 
questionnaire specifically asked all respondents if failing to disclose 
the client’s actual DONS status if opposing counsel failed to ask 
about it was a misrepresentation. The correct answer is ―yes.‖ 
1. Gender 
A comparison of women’s and men’s responses in response to this 
question appears in Table 6 below. 
TABLE 6  
MISREPRESENTATION BY GENDER 
QUESTION RESPONSE 
GENDER 
FEMALE MALE 
If opposing counsel fails to ask about the 
client's DONS status, is it a 
misrepresentation to refrain from 
disclosing his true DONS status during the 
negotiation? 
Yes 55% 64% 
No 28% 26% 
Don’t know 17% 10% 
Note: x2(2, n = 617) = 6.4; p < .05 
  
 
 92. x2(10, n = 500) = 25.7; p < .01 
 93. Rule 4.1, cmt. 1. 
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Men recognized that the client’s request was a misrepresentation 
at a higher rate than women (64 to 55 percent), but both groups 
erroneously answered ―no‖ at nearly the same rate. Women answered 
―don’t know‖ at a 17 percent of the time, while only 10 percent of the 
men selected this answer. The results reported here are statistically 
significant.
94
 
2. Time Since Licensure 
A comparison of responses to the misrepresentation question 
organized by time since licensure appears in Table 7 below. 
TABLE 7 
MISREPRESENTATION BY TIME SINCE LICENSURE 
QUESTION RESPONSE 
TIME SINCE LICENSURE (IN YEARS) 
FEWER 
THAN 10 
10 TO 
19 
20 OR 
MORE 
If opposing counsel fails to ask 
about the client's DONS status, is 
it a misrepresentation to refrain 
from disclosing his DONS status 
during the negotiation? 
Yes 55% 54% 69% 
No 28% 31% 22% 
Don't 
Know 
17% 14% 9% 
Note: x2(4, n = 619) = 15.1; p < 0.1 
 
The attorneys with twenty or more years since licensure correctly 
answered the misrepresentation question at a rate of 69 percent, while 
the other two groups of attorneys answered ―yes‖ at comparable 
percentages in the mid-50s. The ―no‖ and ―don’t know‖ answers 
were more bunched, with a six percentage difference among the three 
categories in the ―no‖ responses and an eight percentage difference 
among the three categories in the ―don’t know‖ responses. The 
results of this analysis were statistically significant.
95
  
 
 94. x2(2, n = 617) = 6.4; p < .05 
 95. x2(4, n = 619) = 15.1; p < .01 
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3. Gender by Time Since Licensure 
A comparison of responses to the misrepresentation question 
organized by gender and time since licensure appears in Table 8 
below. 
TABLE 8 
MISREPRESENTATION BY GENDER AND TIME SINCE LICENSURE 
QUESTION 
TIME SINCE LICENSURE (IN YEARS) 
RESPONSE 
FEMALE MALE 
FEWER 
THAN 10 
10 TO 
19 
20 OR 
MORE 
FEWER 
THAN 10 
10 TO 
19 
20 OR 
MORE 
If opposing counsel fails 
to ask about the client's 
DONS status, is it a 
misrepresentation to 
refrain from disclosing 
his DONS status during 
the negotiation? 
Yes 54% 53% 58% 56% 54% 72% 
No 27% 29% 28% 28% 33% 21% 
Don’t 
Know 
19% 18% 14% 15% 13% 7% 
Note: x2(10, n = 617) = 20.8; p < .05 
 
As Table 8 reveals, male respondents with twenty or more years 
of experience had the highest rate of correct answers and the lowest 
rate of incorrect answers to this question, with 72 percent answering 
―yes,‖ 21 percent answering ―no,‖ and only 7 percent answering 
―don’t know.‖ The remaining groups were comparable with ―yes‖ 
answers in the mid-50 percent range, ―no‖ in the high-20 to low-30 
percent range, and ―don’t know‖ in the range of the mid-to-high-teen 
percentages. The data in Table 8 is statistically significant.
96
 
D. Client Confidence 
As explained earlier, Rule 4.1’s admonition against engaging in 
fraudulent or criminal conduct in conjunction with Rule 1.2’s 
prohibition of engaging in criminal or fraudulent conduct overrides 
 
 96. x2(10, n = 617) = 20; p < .05 
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Rule 1.6’s general rule for keeping client confidences.97 The 
hypothetical used in this study focuses on this interaction of the 
professional rules of conduct and results in the conclusion that the 
client’s DONS status is not a protected client confidence. To test 
respondents on this issue, the questionnaire also asked whether the 
client’s DONS status was protected from disclosure by the 
professional rules of conduct for attorneys. The correct answer is 
―no.‖ 
1. Gender 
A comparison of participants’ responses to this question based on 
gender appears in Table 9 below. 
TABLE 9 
CLIENT CONFIDENCE BY GENDER 
QUESTION RESPONSE 
GENDER 
FEMALE MALE 
Is the client’s DONS status a client 
confidence protected from disclosure by 
the professional rules of conduct? 
Yes 52% 54% 
No 22% 29% 
Don’t know 27% 17% 
Note: x2(2, n = 627) = 9.7; p < .01 
 
As Table 9 illustrates, the differences between men and women 
appear in the ―no‖ and ―don’t know‖ responses, with men answering 
―no‖ at a higher rate than women (29 to 22 percent) and women 
answering ―don’t know‖ at a higher rate than men (27 to 17 percent). 
The results reported here are statically significant.
98
  
 
 97. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 98. x2(2, n = 617) = 9.7; p < .01 
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2. Time Since Licensure 
A comparison of participants’ responses to the client confidence 
question organized by time since licensure appears in Table 10 
below. 
TABLE 10 
CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY BY TIME SINCE LICENSURE 
QUESTION RESPONSE 
TIME SINCE LICENSURE (IN YEARS) 
FEWER THAN 
10 
10 TO 
19 
20 OR 
MORE 
Is the client’s DONS status 
confidence protected from 
disclosure by the professional 
rules of conduct? 
Yes 48% 50% 58% 
No 30% 24% 27% 
Don’t Know 22% 26% 15% 
Note: x2(4, n = 619) = 10.9; p < .05 
The respondents with fewer than ten years since licensure 
outperformed the other respondents on this question. They answered 
―no‖ at a higher rate than the next best group (30 to 27 percent, the 
respondents with twenty or more years since licensure) and answered 
―yes‖ at a slightly lower rate than the next best group (48 to 50 
percent, the respondents with ten to nineteen years since licensure). 
The most experienced respondents had the highest number of 
erroneous responses (―yes‖) at 58 percent and the lowest number of 
―don’t know‖ responses at 15 percent. The results in Table 10 were 
statistically significant.
99
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3. Gender by Time Since Licensure  
A comparison of participant responses to the query about the 
confidentiality of client’s DONS status, based on gender and time 
since licensure, appears in Table 11 below. 
TABLE 11 
CLIENT CONFIDENCE BY GENDER AND TIME SINCE LICENSURE 
QUESTION 
GENDER AND TIME SINCE LICENSURE (IN YEARS) 
RESPONSE 
TO CLIENT’S 
REQUEST 
FEMALE MALE 
FEWER 
THAN 
10 
10 TO 
19 
20 OR 
MORE 
FEWER 
THAN 
10 
10 TO 
19 
20 OR 
MORE 
Is the client's DONS 
status a client confidence 
protected from 
disclosure by the 
professional rules of 
conduct? 
Yes 49% 45% 60% 47% 51% 57% 
No 25% 24% 15% 33% 25% 31% 
Don’t know 25% 31% 25% 19% 24% 12% 
Note: x2(10, n = 617) = 22.1; p < .05    
 
The women and men with twenty or more years since licensure 
answered this question incorrectly (―yes‖) at a rate of 60 percent and 
57 percent, respectively, which is higher than any of the other groups. 
Furthermore, the women with twenty or more years’ experience had 
the lowest percentage of correct (―no‖) answers at 15 percent, nine 
percent lower than the next lowest group, women with ten to nineteen 
years of experience. Finally, the men with twenty or more years since 
licensure had the fewest responses in the ―not sure‖ category with 12 
percent while women with ten to nineteen years’ experience had the 
highest response rate in this category at 31 percent. The results in 
Table 11 are statistically significant.
100
  
 
 100. x2(10, n = 617) = 22.1; p < .05 
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VI. DISCUSSION 
This study was designed to examine gender differences in the 
decisions attorneys make when presented with an ethical dilemma 
during a negotiation. Our analysis, however, found more at work than 
simply gender. Specifically, we found that gender, professional 
experience, and the interaction between these two variables 
correlated with participants’ responses for the client’s second request, 
understanding that the client requested a misrepresentation, and 
understanding that the information requested was not a protected 
client confidence. While professional experience can explain some of 
the gender differences found in this study, it is not the only 
explanation. In addition to professional experience, we hypothesize 
that the outcomes of our study were influenced by gender differences 
in ethical decision-making processes, gender socialization regarding 
advocacy, and the framing of the particular ethical dilemma. We 
discuss these four factors below. 
A. Professional Experience and Ethical Reasoning 
In our study, variances in professional experience appeared to be a 
primary contributor to participants’ ethical decisions. Though the 
body of research on the impact of professional experience on ethics is 
limited, most of these studies suggest that experience interacts with 
gender to influence employees’ ethical decision-making. For 
example, one study examined nonlawyer employees in four career 
stages and determined that those in later career stages provided more 
ethical responses than those in earlier career stages; it also 
determined that more experience decreased gender differences in 
ethical attitudes.
101
 Another study confirmed these findings, as it 
discovered that gender differences in ethical reasoning declined as 
the work experience of the sample increased.
102
  
As a result of these and other similar studies, we anticipated that 
professional experience might be a factor producing differences in 
responses between men and women. In our study, men and women 
 
 101. Weeks et al., supra note 23, at 309–10.  
 102. Franke et al., supra note 71. 
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did differ overall in their years of experience, with women 
significantly more likely than men to have either fewer than ten or 
between ten and nineteen years of experience and men being more 
likely to have more than twenty years of experience.
103
 However, 
differences in professional experience appeared to affect respondents’ 
decision-making in ways we did not anticipate. For example, in 
response to the client’s second request, women with fewer than ten 
years of experience were more likely than any other respondent group 
to agree to the client’s request to engage in a fraudulent settlement 
scheme, but women with more than twenty years of experience were 
more likely to be unsure of what they would do.
104
 When asked if the 
client’s DONS status was protected from disclosure, both men and 
women with less experience performed better.
105
 Consistent with the 
theory that time in profession improves individuals’ ethical 
reasoning, the men with the most experience outperformed the other 
men in response to the question of whether the client’s request 
constituted a misrepresentation.
106
 However, the women with the 
most experience performed marginally better than the other 
women.
107
 Furthermore, both women’s and men’s answers improved 
with experience in response to the client’s second request, although 
not linearly.
108
  
Experience was one of the factors that affected the results, and it 
appeared to work in concert with gender. But other factors had to 
affect the results. How else can we explain the fact that the highly 
experienced women were the most likely to report that they were 
unsure what they would do in response to the client’s second request? 
Since our study did not test any other gender-related theories, we are 
left to hypothesize how those factors and theories work in 
conjunction with professional experience. The next Sections address 
potential gender and decision-making theories that may explain our 
results.  
 
 103. See supra tbl.2. 
 104. See supra tbl.5. 
 105. See supra tbl.11. 
 106. See supra tbl.8. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See supra tbl.5. 
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B. Gender, Decision-Making Processes, and Ethical Reasoning 
Decision-making is a complex cognitive process, but most studies 
of gender differences in ethics have assumed a fairly direct 
relationship between respondents’ genders and their ethical 
behaviors.
109
 However, a few authors have suggested that gender 
alone is not sufficient to predict or explain respondents’ differences 
in decision-making. Of the theories offered to explain why gender 
differences in ethical decision-making occur, two seem particularly 
relevant to our findings. The first focuses on differences in men’s and 
women’s ethical orientations, while the other examines how men and 
women differentially use information to make decisions. 
1. Gender and Ethical Orientation 
Our results may have been influenced by gender differences in 
ethical orientation. Ethical orientation refers to the core beliefs and 
values that provide a framework for one’s decision-making.110 In her 
seminal work In a Different Voice, Harvard psychologist Carol 
Gilligan proposed that men and women have distinctly different 
moral orientations and, as a result, solve moral dilemmas through 
different processes, which can lead to differing results.
111
 According 
to her theory, women view moral issues in terms of relationships, 
caring, harmony, and compassion, thereby creating a ―morality of 
responsibility‖ or an ―ethic of care.‖112 Men, on the other hand, 
approach moral issues in terms of individual rights, rules, and justice, 
and therefore create a ―morality of rights‖ or an ―ethic of justice.‖113 
She contends that an ethic of justice stresses reciprocity and respect 
and argues for treating others fairly, while an ethic of care 
emphasizes responding to others’ needs and supports the belief that 
 
 109. See, e.g., Sara Jaffee & Janet Shibley Hyde, Gender Differences in Moral 
Orientations: A Meta-Analysis, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 703, 710–12, 719 (2000) (reviewing 113 
studies of gender research).  
 110. See Rebecca A. Luzadis, & Megan W. Gerhardt, An Exploration of the Relationship 
Between Ethical Orientation and Goal Orientation, 5 J. ACAD. & BUS. ETHICS 1, 2 (2012).  
 111. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S 
DEVELOPMENT 166 (1982). 
 112. Id. at 21, 73, 164, 173. 
 113. Id. at 21, 73, 164, 172. 
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one should not turn away from someone in need.
114
 Gilligan’s 
approach, also known as gender socialization theory, asserts that the 
sexes bring differing values to their professions and that these 
differing approaches will influence their work-related ethical 
decision-making.
115
  
One study using Gilligan’s theory as a framework examined how 
women describe their processes of knowing and responding to moral 
dilemmas.
116
 In interviews of 135 women, the researchers descibed 
several ―ways of knowing,‖ two of which were associated with care 
and one with justice.
117
 The two associated with care were labeled 
―connected knowing‖ and ―constructed knowledge.‖118 Connected 
knowing refers to a process of understanding that arises from 
―personal, particular, and grounded firsthand experience.‖119 
Constructed knowledge occurs as a result of tolerating internal 
contradiction and ambiguities, asking questions and seeking 
integration between self and understanding.
120
 The justice-related 
category of ―separate knowing‖ values objectivity, adversarialism, 
reasoned critical discourse, rationality, public dialogue, and 
suppression of self.
121
 The authors questioned whether women more 
often engage in connected knowing than men, who are often viewed 
as being more heavily engaged in separate knowing,
122
 but could 
make no conclusions since men were not interviewed as part of the 
study. 
Some occupational psychologists have predicted that any 
differences between the sexes due to gender socialization will be 
overridden by occupational roles and their reward systems.
123
 
According to this explanation, known as structural theory, the 
 
 114. Id. at 73. 
 115. Franke et al., supra note 71, at 921; Robin & Babin, supra note 12, at 63. 
 116. MARY FIELD BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN’S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
SELF, VOICE, AND MIND 11 (1997). 
 117. Id. at 12, 15. 
 118. Id. at 15, 101. 
 119. Id. at 113. 
 120. See id. at 137. 
 121. Id. at 104–12. 
 122. Id. at 102–03. The other two ways of knowing were ―silence‖ (not expressing a sense 
of knowing) and ―received knowledge‖ (which relies on information from authorities). Id. at 15.  
 123. See Franke et al., supra note 71, at 921; Robin & Babin, supra note 12, at 63. 
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differentiating factor in ethical decision-making is the difference in 
positions within an organization, not differences in gender.
124
 
Structural theory tends to describe ethical movement as occurring in 
one direction, with females adopting male ethical attitudes and 
behavior under similar professional business occupational 
conditions.
125
  
Several studies have examined both gender socialization theory 
and structural theory as they apply to lawyers and law students. An 
early 1990’s study of law students at Temple University Law School 
found that, during the first year of law school, female law students 
exhibited more care-oriented moral reasoning than their male 
counterparts, who exhibited more rights-oriented moral reasoning.
126
 
However, female students’ rights orientation had increased to nearly 
match that of their male counterparts by the end of the first year of 
law school, and their care orientation also had decreased to nearly 
match that of their male cohorts, supporting the structural theory.
127
 
Studies of lawyers, however, present a more nuanced picture.  
A recent study of Australian lawyers concluded that women 
lawyers are pressured to present a male professional persona, yet an 
ethic of care is present in their lawyering.
128
 This adoption of 
professional norms while maintaining feminine ethical reasoning is 
also evident in a study of lawyers from Washington State. Before 
being presented with a series of moral dilemmas, the lawyer subjects 
were interviewed, and significantly more women than men were 
identified as having a care-based orientation.
129
 When faced with a 
hypothetical situation where the rules governing attorney conduct 
were clear, female lawyers adopted a rights-based response to address 
 
 124. Franke et al., supra note 71, at 921; Robin & Babin, supra note 12, at 63–64. 
 125. Franke et al., supra note 71, at 921; Robin & Babin, supra note 12, at 63–64. 
 126. Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. 
REV. 193, 222–24 (1991). 
 127. Id. at 229–30. 
 128. Bartlett & Aitken, supra note 79, at 249.  
 129. See RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL 
DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS 188–89 (1989). In part 
one of the interview, 77 percent of the men and 36 percent of the women were identified as 
having a rights-based orientation, and 64 percent of the women and 23 percent of the men were 
identified as having a care-based orientation. Id. at 188. In part two of the interview, 77 percent 
of the men and 41 percent of the women were identified as having a rights-based orientation, 
and 59 percent of the women and 23 percent of the men had a care-based orientation. Id. at 189. 
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the situation.
130
 But in a second hypothetical where role expectations 
and the legal rules at play were not so clear, female lawyers’ care-
based orientations came to the fore.
131
  
The results of these two studies are consonant with our research 
outcomes. The more straightforward scenario, the client’s first 
request, resulted in no differences between women and men.
132
 
However, the more ambiguous of the two scenarios, the client’s 
second request, resulted in gender differences.
133
 This lack of 
certainty may have created an opening for women to focus less on a 
rules-based approach and exhibit a care-based orientation to decision-
making. In other words, focusing on the client’s needs and suffering 
may have resulted in a greater likelihood for the women respondents 
either to agree to the client’s second request or to be unsure how they 
should proceed.  
2. Gender and Information Processing During Decision-Making 
Researchers in the 1990s began to explore the idea that decision-
making was not entirely an individual process; that is, they started to 
examine factors other than individual personality, temperament, or 
cognitive complexity that could influence how people make 
decisions. For example, in one study psychologists proposed that 
three types of factors affect individuals’ decision-making process: 
task factors, internal factors, and environmental factors.
134
 Task 
factors include the types of information available as well as the 
uncertainty of the available alternatives, time pressure, and possible 
consequences of a potential decision.
135
 Internal factors referred to 
the decision-maker’s motivation, emotion, and experience, while 
environmental factors described issues such as social influence, 
coercion, and work demands.
136
 Another study building on this theory 
 
 130. See id. at 74–75. 
 131. See id. at 80. 
 132. See generally Part V.A. 
 133. See supra tbl.3 (women were more likely than men to either indicate they would agree 
to the client’s request or that they were not sure what they would do in that situation). 
 134. Janis A. Canon-Bowers et al., Establishing the Boundaries of a Paradigm for 
Decision-Making Research, 38 HUM. FACTORS 193, 197 (1996). 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. 
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assessed the importance respondents attached to various issues 
associated with the decision-making process: uncertainty, 
time/money constraints, information and goals, consequences of the 
decision, motivation, self-regulation, emotions, cognition, social 
pressure, and work pressure.
137
 The researchers found no sex 
differences occurred in cognition and self-regulation.
138
 In other 
words, women and men did not differ in the intellectual aspects of 
decision-making like categorizing data, thinking logically to evaluate 
consequences, and problem-solving.
139
 However, women and men 
did differ with regard to a number of other factors. Women were 
more concerned than men with uncertainty and doubts related to their 
decisions, placed more value on time and money, were more 
concerned about the consequences of their decisions, were more 
aware of the constraints of the setting and other parties, and saw 
emotion as more important to them in the decision process.
140
 Men, 
on the other hand, placed more importance on the analysis of the 
information relevant to the decision, were ―more focused on the 
definition of the goals or purposes of the decision,‖141 were ―more 
motivated during the process,‖142 and felt work-related pressures 
more intensely.
143
  
These differences may explain the differences in responses 
between women and men in our study. Given that the client in the 
study scenario faced considerable constraints due to his loss of 
income, property, and psychological well-being, it may be that 
women, more than men, factored this information into their decision-
making. In addition, these constraints, as well as the conditions under 
which the client became involved in the lawsuit, may have 
engendered positive emotions or sympathy toward the client and 
negative ones or antipathy toward the other party. If this were the 
 
 137. María L. Sanz de Acedo Lizárraga et al., Factors That Affect Decision Making: 
Gender and Age Differences, 7 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. & PSCYHOL. THERAPY 381, 385–87 (2007).  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  
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case, then it may have influenced women’s decision-making 
processes more than men’s. 
The men in our study also may have been more likely to make 
ethical choices in response to the client’s second request because 
their decisions were more influenced by their analysis of the 
information available to them, including the professional code of 
conduct. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that men performed 
better than women in recognizing that the client’s request was a 
misrepresentation and that the client’s DONS status was not a 
protected client confidence.
144
 Since this study was not framed as a 
study of ethics but rather as a study of legal negotiation strategies, 
some male participants may have included the ethical implications of 
their decisions in their analysis more than did women participants. 
And if women were focused on their client’s outcomes and felt 
empathy for the client, they may not have as readily recognized the 
ethical nature of their choices as did men.  
C. Gender, Advocacy, and Ethical Decision-Making 
Another contributing factor to our findings may have been a 
difference in women’s negotiating behavior for others versus 
themselves. Research reveals that women often negotiate less 
effectively and aggressively for themselves than do men but that 
women are more effective negotiators than men when they advocate 
for others.
145
 For instance, in a study examining pay allocation, the 
authors found that women paid themselves less than did men; in 
addition, they paid others more than they paid themselves.
146
 In 
another study, in which college females and males wrote letters 
requesting an internship and accompanying salary for themselves or 
for others (and where they believed the reader would know the 
gender of the letter writer), women requested 8 percent less for 
 
 144. See supra tbls.6, 8, 9 and 11.  
 145. See Mary E. Wade, Women and Salary Negotiation: The Costs of Self-Advocacy, 25 
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 65, 68 (2001); LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T 
ASK: THE HIGH COST OF AVOIDING NEGOTIATION AND POSITIVE STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 
170 (2007). 
 146. Charlene M. Callahan-Levy & Lawrence A. Messé, Sex Differences in the Allocation 
of Pay, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 433, 437 (1979). 
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themselves but 9 percent more for others compared to men.
147
 In a 
third study, the authors examined how male and female senior 
executives would negotiate when advocating for themselves as 
candidates for a new management position versus advocating for one 
of their employees.
148
 In this case, women negotiated 18 percent 
higher salaries for others than for themselves.
149
 In another study, 
men set goals 10 percent higher for themselves than they did for 
others; that is, men appeared prepared to negotiate higher salaries for 
themselves than others.
150
 
In addition to advocating more forcefully for others, women also 
are more likely to advocate more aggressively in their professional 
roles than in their personal ones. That is, when their professional role 
requires negotiating, women may feel more comfortable being 
assertive, perhaps in part because they believe their professional role 
lends credence to the value of their requests.
151
 This may be 
particularly true for women attorneys. 
Both of these conditions, acting in a professional role and 
advocating for others, may have influenced women’s negotiating 
behavior and ethical choices in our study. Since women advocate 
more strongly for others than do men and feel more justified in acting 
assertively for others, it is possible that the women in our study 
focused more on their advocacy for the client, causing their ethical 
obligations to fade into the background. Obviously this effect was 
mitigated with respect to the client’s first request, but it may have led 
the women respondents to be more likely to agree to the client’s 
second request or to be less certain regarding what they would and 
should do.  
 
 147. BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 145, at 171. 
 148. Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock & Kathleen L. McGinn, Constraints and 
Triggers: Situational Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 951, 958 (2005).  
 149. Id. at 959. 
 150. Cf. id. at 957 (finding that men expected to pay 10 percent less in negotiations). 
 151. See id. at 962. 
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D. Situational Framing and Ethical Decision-Making 
As we have noted throughout, between the two client requests, 
gender differences were found only for the client’s second request, 
which suggests that the framing of the ethical situation may have 
played a role in the respondents’ decisions. Framing—the way 
information is presented—has been found in numerous studies to 
influence how people respond and make decisions.
152
 Furthermore, a 
range of studies have ascertained that framing affects the decision-
making processes of women and men differentially.
153
 Framing 
occurs at two levels, both of which affect how individuals make 
decisions.
154
 At one level is the type of situation presented, such as 
whether the situation involves a gain or a loss,
155
 and the other 
concerns the way the situation is presented, including the situation’s 
ambiguity.
156
 In other words, this second level asks whether the 
principle at issue is considered to be a simple black-and-white issue, 
or a more complex issue, involving shades of gray.  
At least two studies support the claim that more ambiguity in the 
situation increases the likelihood of gender differences in ethical 
decision-making. An in-depth analysis of Washington State attorneys 
found that women and men differed in their responses to ambiguous 
ethical situations.
157
 As situations become more ambiguous, 
individuals rely more on their personal morality for guidance, and 
 
 152. See, e.g., John A. Fleishman, The Effects of Decision Framing and Others’ Behavior 
on Cooperation in a Social Dilemma, 32 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 162, 174–76 (1988); William C. 
McDaniel & Francis Sistrunk, Management Dilemmas and Decisions: Impact of Framing and 
Anticipated Responses, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 21, 40 (1991); Daniel J. Svyantek & Arno R. 
Kolz, The Effects of Organizational Frames and Problem Ambiguity on Decision Making, 11 J. 
BUS. & PSYCHOL. 131, 146–47 (1996).  
 153. See, e.g., Kara I. Gabriel & Ashley Williamson, Framing Alters Risk-Taking Behavior 
on a Modified Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) in a Sex-Specific Manner, 107 PSYCHOL. 
REP. 699, 699–700, 709 (2010); Yunhui Huang & Lei Wang, Sex Differences in Framing 
Effects Across Task Domain, 48 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 649, 649–50, 652–
53 (2010); Irwin P. Levin et al., The Interaction of Experiential and Situational Factors and 
Gender in a Simulated Risky Decision-Making Task, 122 J. PSYCHOL. 173, 179–80 (1988). 
 154. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981). 
 155. Id. at 453, 457. 
 156. See JACK & JACK, supra note 129, at 93. 
 157. Id. 
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women are far more likely than men to employ an ethic of care.
158
 
Consequently, the study’s authors suggest that when it is unclear 
which rules are in play, men and women are likely to respond 
differently.
159
 Similarly, a second study discovered that when 
ambiguous or ―gray‖ scenarios were used, gender differences 
occurred and the presence of these differences varied by vignette.
160
  
Something similar occurred in our study. Respondents faced a 
legal negotiation that was presented, or framed, in two different 
ways—first as a request that included the possibility of the 
respondent engaging in a direct lie and later as a request for a lie of 
omission. Although the client’s first request does not specify the type 
of deception that will be required, it does indicate that the respondent 
is being asked to engage in a lie of commission should the need arise. 
And the rules of the game were clearer because basic rules of ethics 
prohibit one from directly stating a falsehood.
161
 As a consequence, it 
is possible that both women and men were equally likely to reach 
their decisions by reasoning according to the rule of rights mentality, 
and, therefore, no significant difference arose between men’s and 
women’s responses. The second request explicitly leaves out the 
request for a direct lie; rather, it asks the respondent to withhold 
information unless asked for it, apparently placing responsibility on 
the other party to make the truth come out. Thus, the client is asking 
the respondent to commit a lie of omission. In omission situations, 
the rules of play are more ambiguous, so that one’s professional 
morality may give way just enough to allow one’s personal morality 
to surface, perhaps leading women’s care orientation to re-emerge 
and affect their responses.
162
 
We believe the willingness to commit, or at least consider 
committing, an unethical act is also influenced by the framing of the 
ethical issue. Supporting this conclusion is a line of research 
revealing that, in general, people are more willing to agree to morally 
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objectionable behavior by engaging in lies of omission than 
commission.
163
 That is, it is easier for many people to justify not 
revealing a fact if one is not asked about it because of the ―blurred 
moral responsibility involving acts of omission.‖164 And it isn’t only 
those who engage in such behavior who feel this way; third parties 
also condemn others less harshly when a moral offense occurs by 
omission rather than by commission.
165
 
In addition, research suggests that self-perceived identity 
influences moral behavior more for acts of commission (committing 
a bad act) than omission (failing to do a good act).
166
 That is, taking 
action or ―doing something‖ reveals more information regarding who 
one is than not doing something.
167
 Thus, behavior in the active sense 
may be more likely to implicate the self and thereby activate the 
identity process than passive behavior.
168
 The results of at least one 
study suggest that, compared to an omitted act, a committed act 
generates more cognitive processing as to who one is, thereby 
activating the identity process.
169
 Furthermore, in cases of omission, 
individuals may not see themselves as responsible for an outcome, 
thus failing to frame the situation in moral terms as having done a 
bad thing.
170
 
In sum, we believe the framing of the client’s second request, 
which requested only lies of omission, leads to a sense of ambiguity 
regarding ethical principles and to less cognitive processing regarding 
ethics and the respondents’ ethical identities. In addition it offered a 
less morally objectionable option than outright lying. These 
conditions, combined with women’s greater care orientation, may 
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have resulted in women being more willing to act unethically and/or 
to be less sure how they would respond to the client’s request. 
VII. STUDY LIMITATIONS 
While surveys containing hypothetical negotiation scenarios 
provide a viable manner of studying negotiation,
171
 they do have 
limitations. A study’s external validity, the extent to which its 
findings can be generalized to individuals and circumstances beyond 
those in the study itself, is determined by the degree to which it 
reflects real world conditions.
172
 As long as the study elicits 
responses similar to those in the real world, the results may be 
generalized to other situations.
173
 Additionally, socially desirable 
responses (i.e., responses people believe they should give as opposed 
to those that they actually would give) are problematic when 
individuals know they are participating in ethics research.
174
 
Confidential surveys and anonymous responses can help minimize 
such biases
175
 but cannot eliminate them entirely. 
The present scenario differed from a ―real world‖ negotiation in 
that we limited the number of options available to respond to the 
client’s two requests. Participants were only given the option to 
accept, decline, or say they were unsure. It is possible that 
respondents felt constrained by or simply rejected these options and 
selected ―not sure‖ because of the more nuanced manner in which 
they would address such requests in the real world.
176
 And, to avoid 
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the problem of socially desirable responses, none of the materials 
available to participants referred to the study as a negotiation ethics 
study.
177
 
Finally, this study focuses on gender as if it were an independent 
variable in the negotiation calculus. But gender is a 
multidimensional, social-psychological construct that interacts with 
other personal and situational variables.
178
 As a result, there may be 
other principles at work here that we were unable to identify. 
Furthermore, to conclude that women and men constitute monolithic 
homogenous groups of people who act the same when presented with 
a certain set of facts is erroneous. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Studying the relationship between gender and ethical reasoning is 
often accompanied by some sense of trepidation on the researchers’ 
part. This is especially true for a study like ours where men 
outperform women, appearing to fly in the face both of previous 
research and of societal beliefs about women’s ethical superiority. 
However, we don’t actually believe it does. Rather, we see our study 
as providing a nuanced examination of ethical decision making and 
how individuals manage their professional and personal codes of 
ethics in important and often ambiguous situations. And our study 
suggests that, for women, managing these codes is more fraught than 
it is for men. 
Because professional legal ethics relies on the rule of rights, it 
appears to be easier for men to reconcile their own personal rights 
orientation with their professional responsibilities. But for women, 
more of whom likely have a care orientation, reconciling one’s 
personal ethical code with one’s professional responsibility code may 
require more effort. Our study indicates that in situations where the 
professional code of ethics easily resolves the issue, men and women 
respond similarly. When the situation becomes more ambiguous, 
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one’s personal ethical identity is activated, and women and men 
respond differently. In these situations, women and men may rely on 
different sources of information and be more attuned to their own 
emotional understanding of potential outcomes, which allows women 
to invoke their underlying care orientation. Thus, in such situations, 
women may struggle with honoring their professional versus personal 
codes of ethics. Despite this finding, we believe it is likely that 
neither men nor women hold the upper hand concerning ethical 
behavior. They respond differently to ethical challenges depending 
on the ethical situation, their years of experience with the issue at 
hand, and their own personal ethical orientation. 
Based on what we have learned from the present study, we believe 
future studies examining the interaction between gender and other 
factors that affect ethical decision-making are warranted. 
Specifically, extending our study by videotaping practicing lawyers 
engaging in the DONS simulation would offer two benefits—it 
would allow participants to manifest a variety of behaviors and 
responses to the scenario (as opposed to the three choices we 
provided) and provide a more realistic experience compared to what 
is available with a survey. In addition, because our findings suggest 
that framing may significantly affect women and men’s ethical 
decision making, future studies would benefit from including a 
variety of scenarios that vary by topic and presentation. Finally, all 
studies of gender and ethics would be strengthened if men’s and 
women’s gender orientation, rather than just their biological sex, 
were used to differentiate participants from one another. All members 
of each sex are not homogenous in their gender identities, but rather, 
both sexes vary along the two continua of masculinity and 
femininity.
179
 Assessing individuals’ gender orientations would allow 
a more fine-grained analysis than using sex alone as a variable.  
Another area for further research is the effect that professional 
experience has on negotiation ethics. One would expect more 
experienced lawyers to perform better on ethical issues; younger 
professionals are thought to be more prone to ethical lapses due to 
strong desires for peer acceptance, goal attainment, and performance 
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standards.
180
 Plus, attorneys look to each other to gauge the 
acceptability of their actions,
181
 and observing and mimicking others 
are important methods of learning professional ethics and norms.
182
 
Our results were mixed when addressing whether professional 
experience is an important factor in ethical decision-making; on some 
measures, more experienced respondents performed better, and on 
others, they performed worse. Furthermore, if professional 
experience is a consistent factor in better ethical decision-making, 
then one of our teaching goals should be to begin students’ 
maturation process earlier than it otherwise would so that they can 
achieve better results quicker.   
One purpose of this study is to build off of our prior work by 
investigating the differences between men and women with regard to 
negotiation ethics. This purpose, however, serves a broader purpose 
involving behavioral ethics—we want to learn how attorneys behave 
when confronted with ethical dilemmas.
183
 In other fields, the concept 
of behavioral ethics is becoming a critical component in the 
understanding of professional ethics and ethical training.
184
 By 
applying these concepts to lawyers, we can better understand how 
unintentional but predictable cognitive patterns result in unethical 
conduct. 
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